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FOREWORD
Over the past 20 years, Brazil has made great strides
in consolidating a multiparty democracy, taming macroeconomic instability, and attacking deep-seated social
issues like poverty and exclusion. It has also become
an ever more important player in the global arena, assuming a key role in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping
missions, South American economic and political integration, debates over world trade and politics, and other
issues.
Given Brazil’s growing regional and global influence, it is imperative that U.S. policymakers achieve a
fine-grained understanding of Brazilian foreign policy
and the motivations that drive its leaders. In this monograph, Hal Brands critiques Brazilian grand strategy as
it has developed over the past 8 years in the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brands acknowledges the sophistication and accomplishments of
Lula’s grand strategy, but he argues Brazil still confronts
several challenging strategic dilemmas—ranging from
persistent internal problems to the increasingly competitive nature of its relations with the United States—that
could negatively impact its geopolitical potential. Dealing with these dilemmas, and charting a steady course in
U.S.-Brazilian relations, is thus the difficult task that falls
to Lula’s successors.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as an important contribution to the debate
over Brazilian foreign policy and its implications for the
United States and the global system.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. During Lula’s nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a
multipronged grand strategy aimed at hastening the
transition from unipolarity and Western economic hegemony to a multipolar order in which international
rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to
Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing
three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing against the
United States, building coalitions to magnify Brazilian
negotiating power, and seeking to position Brazil as
the leader of a more united South America.
This strategy has successfully raised Brazil’s profile
and increased its diplomatic flexibility, but it has also
exposed the country to four potent strategic dilemmas
that could complicate or undermine its ascent. First,
issues like poor infrastructure, rampant crime, and excessive taxation and regulation of the economy may
impede Brazil from attaining the strong economic
growth and social cohesion necessary to sustain such
an ambitious strategic project. Second, in dealing with
South America, the Brazilian political class has not
reconciled its desire for regional leadership with its
unwillingness to share power or economic benefits
with its neighbors. As a result, many of these countries
perceive Brazil’s diplomacy to be domineering and its
trade policies to be narrowly self-interested, and they
have thus refused to support Lula’s bid for regional
preeminence. Third, at the global level, the long-term
cohesion and effectiveness of Lula’s various diplomatic partnerships is open to question. Fourth, while
Lula has maintained good relations with Washington,
his grand strategy unavoidably entails a growing risk
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of conflict over issues like Iran, trade policy, and the
U.S. diplomatic and military role in Latin America.
Looking ahead, the efficacy of Brazilian grand strategy—and its consequences for U.S. interests—will be
contingent on how Lula’s successors address these dilemmas.
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DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION
Only a few years after America’s post-September
11, 2001 (9/11) displays of military might led commentators like Charles Krauthammer to opine that the
post-Cold War “unipolar moment” was on the verge of
becoming a prolonged “unipolar era,” the international system seems to be moving toward a more diffuse
distribution of power. The United States is widely (if
perhaps debatably) assumed to be in relative decline;
a range of second- and third-tier powers are jockeying
for greater influence. It is now common to hear that
the world is moving toward a “post-American” age,
that we have reached the “end of American exceptionalism” or “the end of American hegemony”—the
common themes in these assessments being the ebbing of U.S. supremacy and the rise of a new class of
powers that will rival Washington for influence in the
21st century.1
Few countries have experienced as remarkable an
improvement in their international stature over the
past decade as Brazil. Brazil has long had a reputation
as a country with a great future—if only it could get
there. As late as 2002, Brazil was wrestling with chronic financial instability, and the election of a president
with a distinguished leftist heritage raised fears of
macroeconomic collapse and resurgent political strife.
Since then, however, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva has won widespread praise for his economic and social initiatives. Building on the initiatives
of his predecessor, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President Lula has sought to channel
the growing national confidence derived from demo-
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cratic consolidation and macroeconomic stability into
a more forceful diplomacy. Brazil has become more
active in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions; it has energetically promoted the India, Brazil,
and South Africa (IBSA), and Brazil, Russia, India, and
China (BRIC) forums as alternative centers of global
power; it has forged economic and technological partnerships with France, Russia, China, and other key
countries; it has put forward a claim to a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council; and it has promoted
South American economic integration as well as new
regional institutions like the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense
Council (CSD). Underlying all this is a sense among
Brazilian policymakers that their country has finally
arrived on the global scene, and that it is destined to
reap the benefits of the ongoing changes in the international system. In this spirit, President Lula has
announced that Brazil will become a great power in
this century, and Brazilian official discourse is infused
with a sense of national strength and purpose. “Brazil
must think big,” said Defense Minister Nelson Jobim
in 2009. “This is the moment in which it’s necessary
to be audacious in order to advance. . . . There is no
longer any possibility of asking Brazil, on the international stage, to take positions that run contrary to its
interests.”2
Purely by dint of its size and economic capacity,
Brazil will exert a strong pull on regional and global
politics in the coming decades. Even under the most
optimistic projections, however, Brazil will not possess the economic or military capacity to compete
with other major powers—namely the United States,
China, and the European Union (EU)—for decades,
if then. If Brazil is to achieve what political scientists
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call “systemic impact”—the ability to shape the global
order in meaningful ways—it will have to do so not
through the inexorable accumulation of geopolitical
weight, but through the resourcefulness of its strategy and diplomacy. Accordingly, this monograph examines Brazilian grand strategy as it has developed
under President Lula with an eye to illuminating its
characteristics, prospects, and implications for the international system in general and the United States in
particular. The present is a propitious time for such
an undertaking; with President Lula set to leave office at the end of 2010, Brazilian grand strategy may
be approaching an inflection point, making a proper
understanding of the strategy pursued over the last
8 years all the more important for Brazilian and U.S.
observers alike.3
This monograph makes two principal arguments,
one pertaining to the nature of Brazilian grand strategy, the second regarding its ramifications and chances
for success. Under President Lula, Brazil has followed
a multi-layered grand strategy that emphasizes a
gradual and peaceful—yet nonetheless significant—
revision of the international order. While Brazilian officials recognize the benefits that their nation has derived from the Pax Americana, they still view the current
order—characterized by U.S. military and strategic
hegemony and the economic hegemony of the West—
as prejudicial to the development, commercial interests, and diplomatic influence of emerging countries
like Brazil. The fundamental goal of Brazilian grand
strategy has thus been to hasten the transition from
the dominance of the developed world to a multipolar
order in which international power balances and institutions are more favorable to the assertion of Brazil’s
interests. Because Brazil still faces, and will continue
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to face, a relative deficit of economic and military
might, President Lula has resorted to a strategy commonly used by “middle powers,” countries that rely
on multilateralism, coalition-building, and other such
methods to achieve systemic influence. At the global
level, he has sought to strengthen international norms
and organizations that can check American power, a
classic soft-balancing technique. He has also forged
overlapping webs of bilateral partnerships and multilateral coalitions designed to diversify Brazil’s commerce, improve its strategic flexibility, and augment
its leverage in international negotiations. This has entailed embracing players from the entire spectrum of
international actors, including countries—Iran being
one notable example—that are deeply hostile to the
United States. At the regional level, President Lula has
committed himself to establishing Brazil as the recognized leader of a more united South America, with the
aim of expanding his country’s power base and hitching its global ambitions to the aggregate geopolitical
weight of its continent.
This grand strategy has clearly benefited Brazil
in the short term, raising the country’s international
profile and creating an array of strategic, commercial,
and diplomatic options that President Lula’s successors may pursue.4 Yet Brazilian grand strategy also
entails four key dilemmas that President Lula has not
been able to resolve, which could obstruct or at the
very least complicate the country’s geopolitical ascent.
First, issues like poor infrastructure, rampant crime,
and excessive taxation and regulation of the economy
may impede Brazil from attaining the strong economic growth and social cohesion necessary to sustain
such an audacious strategic project. Second, in dealing
with South America, the Brazilian political class has
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not reconciled its desire for regional leadership with
its unwillingness to share power or economic benefits
with its neighbors. As a result, many of these countries perceive Brazil’s diplomacy to be domineering
and its trade policies to be narrowly self-interested,
and they have thus refused to support President Lula’s bid for regional preeminence. Third, at the global
level, the long-term usefulness of President Lula’s
various “strategic partnerships” and alliances is open
to question. The IBSA and BRIC forums are much less
cohesive—and thus less diplomatically effective—
than they appear at first glance, and pursuing close
relationships with countries like Iran may ultimately
hurt Brazil’s democratic image and create more problems than opportunities. Fourth, while President Lula
has maintained good relations with Washington, his
grand strategy unavoidably entails a growing risk of
conflict over issues like Iran, trade policy, and the U.S.
diplomatic and military role in Latin America. If not
managed carefully, these frictions could eventually
push U.S.-Brazil relations in a tenser, less productive
direction, impairing the interests of both countries.
Looking ahead, the efficacy of Brazilian grand strategy—and its consequences for U.S. interests—will be
contingent on how President Lula’s successors address these dilemmas.
The remainder of this monograph consists of four
sections. The first discusses Brazil’s strategic culture,
the issues that have traditionally frustrated its desires
for global influence, and the factors underlying the
growing assertiveness of its foreign policy since the return to democratic rule in 1985. The second describes
President Lula’s worldview and details the military,
diplomatic, and commercial components of his grand
strategy. The third evaluates this grand strategy, not-
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ing its accomplishments but also emphasizing the four
key dilemmas mentioned above. The fourth discusses
implications for U.S. and Brazilian policymakers and
offers some brief concluding remarks.
BRAZILIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE
QUEST FOR GREATNESS
When President Lula proclaimed in 2003 that Brazil was ready to “assume its greatness,” he expressed
a deeply held tenet of Brazilian national ideology and
strategic culture. Since the formation of the Republic
in 1889, a variety of factors—Brazil’s continental dimensions, its commanding economic and strategic
position within South America, its relative lack of territorial threats, and its sense of exceptionalism within
the Latin American context—have inspired a belief
that the country belongs among the global elite. “We
possess all the conditions that enable us to aspire to
a place among the world’s great powers,” said Carlos de Meira Mattos, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces, during the 1970s.5
This belief was at the core of Brazilian diplomacy
for much of the 20th century. During World War II,
Brazil was the only Latin American country to contribute ground forces to the Allied cause, deploying
an entire division to Italy. Following the coup against
João Goulart in 1964, the military governments that
ruled for the next 21 years touted the notion of O
Brasil Grande (Greater Brazil). The ideological underpinnings of authoritarian rule—a collection of concepts developed at the Escola Superior de Guerra and
known as National Security Doctrine—emphasized
geopolitical thinking and the projection of national
power. These administrations pursued a firmly anti-
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communist foreign policy within South America, but
simultaneously sought to expand Brazilian influence
in Lusophone Africa and the Third World and thereby
break out of the bipolar framework dominated by the
superpowers. Brazil, announced Foreign Minister Antônio Azeredo da Silveira in 1975, must achieve “an
outstanding position in the world,” free from “the
paths of hegemonic construction of the past.”6 Prominent international observers shared this high opinion
of Brazil’s potential. Henry Kissinger privately predicted that “in 50 years Brazil should have achieved
world power status,” and George Kennan labeled Brazil one of several “monster countries” that might exert
a decisive influence on the global scene.7
Until recently, however, ambition continually outpaced reality. Brazil’s regional rivalry with Argentina
and its condescending attitude toward its neighbors
prevented it from establishing a strong power base
within its home continent (and these two factors continue to loom as obstacles to Brazilian strategy today).
Political instability absorbed the attention of the Brazilian elite; authoritarian rule between 1964 and 1985
drained Brazilian credibility abroad. Under the military governments that ruled during this period, Brazil
was something of a pariah state, as these regimes’ human rights violations and refusal to renounce nuclear
weapons left the country isolated in international
forums. Recurring economic crises, most notably the
hyperinflation and massive debt burdens of the 1980s
and 1990s, further sapped Brazilian strategic potential.
These difficulties often made Brazil seem more like a
basket case than a rising power, and in some international economic circles, there remains skepticism as to
the country’s long-term trajectory.8
Over the past 20 years, however, Brazil has steadily increased its international role, first under three
7

democratic presidents in the 1990s, and then more
rapidly under President Lula since 2003. In one sense,
this activism was born of necessity. As Brazil opened
its economy during the 1980s and 1990s, it became
more sensitive to patterns of globalization forged by
the leading developed countries and institutions like
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As a result,
the only way to protect Brazilian interests and promote Brazilian development was to take a more active
part in shaping the norms, rules, and organizations
that governed the global economy and international
relations more broadly. As President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) put it, the policy of “autonomy through distance” pursued by the military
dictatorships must be replaced by one of “autonomy
through participation, within a changing international
reality.”9 Brazil took a more participatory attitude toward numerous international institutions, contributed to several peacekeeping missions under UN mandate, and led the formation of regional groupings like
Mercosul (Common Market of the South) as a way of
increasing its bargaining power in international economic negotiations.10
What has enabled and sustained these initiatives
is Brazil’s relatively high degree of recent economic
and political progress. The consolidation of a stable,
multiparty democracy has calmed the political vicissitudes that previously intruded upon foreign policy
and has given Brazilian leaders greater credibility in
interacting with a world where democratic rule has
advanced dramatically since the 1970s. In the same
vein, the fact that Brazil has restored macroeconomic
equilibrium and made gradual progress in addressing
widespread poverty through conditional cash transfer
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(CCT) programs like Bolsa Familia has permitted its
diplomats to take a more vocal role in global debates
on poverty and development. As Marco Aurélio Garcia, one of President Lula’s chief advisers on foreign
affairs, acknowledges, “Without the successes of his
social policy, President Lula would not be as respected internationally.”11
Moreover, while macroeconomic growth has been
anemic in recent decades, factors like improved economic stability, growing purchasing power for the
poor and middle class, and the development of both
internal and external markets have allowed Brazil
to crack the top 10 in rankings of the world’s largest
economies (as measured in gross domestic product
[GDP] at purchasing power parity).12 Prominent commentators, including Goldman Sachs, predict that the
country may climb as high as fifth in this ranking in
the next 40 years.13 A thriving biofuels program combined with aggressive offshore drilling has addressed
Brazil’s internal fuel needs and increased its international economic influence amid concerns about the
long-term cost and availability of petroleum supplies,
and the exploitation of the offshore Tupi oil field will
likely make Brazil a major player in the hydrocarbon
market.14 These developments have not only increased
Brazilian economic power and diplomatic standing;
they have also raised national self-confidence after the
trials of the 1980s and 1990s and allowed the foreign
policy community to argue that progress at home justifies and requires expanded ambitions abroad. President Lula alluded to this dynamic when he declared
that “Brazil is ready, Brazil is mature, Brazil is aware
of the game which has to be played.”15 Understanding
how President Lula has played this game requires a
closer examination of his worldview.
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GRAND STRATEGY UNDER PRESIDENT LULA
Brazilian grand strategy under President Lula
has been rooted in a deeply ambivalent view of the
international system. In one sense, Brazil has benefited enormously from “public goods” that the United
States and its Western partners provided during the
postwar—and now the post-Cold War—era. The liberalization of global economic and financial flows has
been a boon to Brazilian development, especially as
that country has opened its own economy over the
past 2 decades. For all of Brazil’s complaints about
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank, these institutions have provided development
assistance and a financial safety net of which Brazil
has more than once availed itself. The long-standing
U.S. defense umbrella over the Western Hemisphere
has afforded Brazil a degree of free security from external threat. Similarly, Washington’s policing of the
global commons has allowed Brazil to trade around
the world without building a Navy capable of protecting that commerce. In this sense, Brazil is very much a
“winner” in the Pax Americana.16
Nonetheless, the prevailing global order still
strikes many Brazilians as fundamentally inequitable.
The UN Security Council is controlled by the five
permanent members (P-5), even though this arrangement distorts current geopolitical realities and keeps
latecomers like Brazil, India, and Japan from rising to
the top echelon of international politics. “The geography of 2009 is different from the geography of 1948
when the UN was created,” President Lula has pointedly noted.17 The unipolarity of the current system is
also troubling. There is no meaningful counterweight
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to the “unilateral” exercise of American power, a fact
that became quite clear in the run-up to the Iraq war.
These issues inform a strong undercurrent of anxiety
in Brazilian geopolitical analysis. “We live in a world
in which intimidation threatens to trample common
sense underfoot,” said Strategic Affairs Minister Roberto Mangabeira in 2008.18
International trade and financial arrangements appear similarly ossified from a Brazilian perspective.
Because organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and
WTO are still dominated by the developed Western
countries, Brazilian officials frequently complain that
the policies of these institutions are slanted against
the interests of the developing world. This impression
has been reinforced by the persistence of U.S. and European agricultural subsidies that inhibit the export
of Brazilian commodities. These subsidies, President
Lula argued at the UN General Assembly in 2006,
“are oppressive shackles that hold back progress and
doom poor countries to backwardness.”19 President
Lula particularly objects to the 54-cent per gallon U.S.
tariff on ethanol imports, and since 2003, Brazil has
refused to allow the Doha Round of the WTO negotiations to proceed until its concerns on agricultural
subsidies are addressed.20 Brazilian discomfort with
prevailing international economic structures became
starkly evident in a series of comments made by toplevel officials in 2008 and 2009. Foreign Minister Celso
Amorim compared U.S. trade representatives to Nazi
propagandists, and President Lula asserted that the
world financial crisis was caused by “the irrational
behavior of white people with blue eyes.”21
Brazilian strategic analysis thus features a pervasive sense of danger—a fear that the strictures of the
current global order might impede Brazil’s develop-
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ment or otherwise limit its potential. But it is also
characterized by a sense of opportunity. Brazilian
officials acknowledge that the United States remains
the dominant player in the international system, but
they view it as unlikely that Washington can maintain
this position indefinitely. As early as the 1990s, a highranking official in the Defense Ministry commented
on “the visible imbalance between its military hegemony and its worrying economic situation, with its
huge domestic and external debt and the technological and administrative competition from other world
powers.”22 Since then, other officials have openly
opined that the United States is in relative decline. As
American power ebbs, the global system will gradually approach a point of greater geopolitical flexibility,
an opening that rising nations like Brazil can exploit
to attain greater influence and freedom of maneuver.
“If we know how to work in the 21st century,” said
President Lula early in his presidency, “this will be
the century of the so-called emerging countries, like
India, Brazil, South Africa, China, Mexico, and Russia,
hitherto considered second-class nations.”23
Under President Lula, the chief aim of Brazilian
grand strategy has been to work for what Minister
Amorim calls “a certain reconfiguration of the world’s
commercial and diplomatic geography”—that is, to
hasten the transition to a multipolar order in which
international norms and institutions no longer favor
the developed world at Brazil’s expense.24 Along these
lines, President Lula has defined Brazilian foreign policy as an “assertive” project rather than a “subaltern”
stance that would imply “acceptance of the guidelines
set by the big power blocs, the U.S. and Europe.”25 In
a speech in September 2003, President Lula outlined
this diplomatic philosophy in dramatic terms:
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We no longer accept participation in international
politics as if we were Latin American wretches; a
Third World country of no account; a worthless country with homeless children; a minor country whose
people only know how to play soccer and dance the
samba. . . . There is no interlocutor anywhere in the
world who respects another who bows his head and
acts as an inferior.26

During his time in office, President Lula has pursued a multi-layered strategy for asserting Brazilian
interests and increasing its global power.
Hard Power and Military Capabilities.
One element of this strategy involves accumulating
traditional hard-power capabilities. “Realists” such as
John Mearsheimer predict that rising powers will seek
to increase their influence and challenge the global hegemon by amassing greater military might, and President Lula has indeed laid much stress on strengthening
Brazil’s armed forces.27 Military spending increased
from $9.23 billion to $23.9 billion between 2003 and
2009, permitting major technological upgrades.28 Brazil has purchased attack helicopters from France and
Russia, combat aircraft and military transports from
European suppliers, as well as four French-made
Scorpene submarines. There are also plans to develop a
nuclear attack submarine in cooperation with France,
and Brazilian officials have arranged to purchase or
develop short-range missiles, night vision equipment,
and thermal and electronic sensors.29 Beyond all this,
the government has presided over the completion
and deployment of the Amazon Surveillance System
(SIVAM), an extensive network of satellites, ground
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sensors, and radars that can monitor not only Brazil’s
vast Amazonian hinterland but also parts of Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and other
neighboring countries.30
Brazil is not simply purchasing equipment; it is also
negotiating agreements that will allow it to develop its
military-industrial base and eventually eliminate any
dependence on foreign suppliers. “We are not engaging in a shopping festival,” says Minister Jobim, “but
in a festival of national technical improvement based
on the transfer of technology.” Brazilian representatives have emphasized joint partnerships between
Brazilian firms and their foreign counterparts and told
European suppliers that they are only interested in
purchases that involve no-strings-attached technology transfers. Given the eagerness of European suppliers to satisfy Brazil’s appetite for advanced weaponry,
it has not been difficult to negotiate a range of joint
projects that will result in the construction of fighter
aircraft, attack helicopters, and, perhaps most notably,
the aforementioned nuclear submarine.31
These acquisitions are part of a broader shift in
Brazilian military strategy and doctrine. Brazil is
moving away from its traditional defense posture, in
which the majority of its forces were deployed in the
southern part of the country, to a newer stance that
focuses on securing internal portions of the country
from criminal urban guerrillas and protecting conflictprone border regions in the Amazon. This latter goal
derives from not simply the need to avert instability
along Brazil’s frontiers, but also an exaggerated fear
that foreign powers, particularly the United States,
covet geopolitical space and natural resources in the
Brazilian Amazon. Along the same lines, defense officials have broached the possibility of patrolling the
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South Atlantic and called for measures to protect the
country’s offshore hydrocarbon resources.32 There are
also plans to develop an asymmetric warfare capability geared toward frustrating attacks by larger powers, as well as a greater emphasis on rapid national
mobilization in crises. Brazil’s armed forces, one planning document states, must be organized “around a
military culture hallmarked by flexibility, imagination, and daring, [with] the capacity to surprise and
overwhelm.”33
President Lula’s military policy is meant to serve
multiple purposes, several of which have more to do
with domestic politics than global ambitions. At the
level of national strategy, however, this buildup is
clearly linked to the drive for greater autonomy and
influence. In planning documents and comments by
high-ranking officials, the nation’s growing military
capabilities are frequently characterized as a means of
shaping events in Brazil’s neighborhood and a “defense shield” against meddling by hegemonic powers.
Just as important, the buildup serves as a symbol of
growing national power and a signal to both regional
and global observers that Brazil intends to pursue a
serious geostrategic role. In 2008, the Chief of Staff of
Brazil’s Navy told an interviewer, “Those who have
nuclear submarines sit on the United Nations Security
Council. All permanent members have the technology,
which none of them give up. We have to develop our
own.”34 In this same spirit, Brazil has participated in
numerous UN peacekeeping missions since the 1990s,
and President Lula’s government eagerly took the
lead in commanding the UN stabilization mission deployed to Haiti in 2004. As Minister Jobim explained
in 2008, “What we want is to have voice and vote in
the international arena, and this only goes to countries
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that have a defense structure to deter and to express
national power.”35
President Lula has clearly not neglected the military foundations of international influence. Even so,
Brazilian officials do not perceive grand strategy primarily in hard-power terms. Military spending as a
percentage of GDP still lags compared to many countries in South America, and even with recent technological upgrades, Brazil will not be able to project
significant military power outside its immediate environs for decades, if then.36 In a broader strategic sense,
American military and technological superiority is
so pronounced that even if Brazil desired to compete
militarily with the United States (and there is little indication it does), any attempt to do so would be futile
and counterproductive. Nor will this power deficit
change anytime soon. Military power is ultimately
derived from economic power, and even the most optimistic forecasts of Brazilian growth over the next 40
years still place that country far behind other centers
of global economic power like the United States, China, and the EU.37 If Brazilian foreign policy is to satisfy
President Lula’s grand ambitions, military capabilities
will have relatively little to do with it.
Middle Power Strategies: Soft Balancing,
Coalition-Building, and Region Formation.
This challenge is a common one for middle powers. According to international relations theorists like
Robert Keohane, middle powers are states that reside
on the periphery of the global elite. They frequently
harbor great-power ambitions and may exert significant influence within a certain area or region, but they
lack the material capabilities to confront the hege-
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monic power (or powers) or to play a central role in
shaping the international system. For middle powers,
achieving global influence thus necessitates punching above their own weight, generally through astute
multilateral diplomacy. A middle power might forge
diplomatic alliances with other rising nations as a way
of magnifying its own influence; it might use international norms and organizations to restrain the behavior of the hegemonic power; it might seek to establish
itself as the leader of a distinct geographic region and
thereby harness its ambitions to the combined geopolitical weight of its neighbors. As Keohane writes,
middle powers “cannot act alone effectively, but may
be able to have a systemic impact in a small group
or through an international institution.”38 In short, a
“middle power strategy” is effectively one of coalition-building and soft balancing.39
Brazilian officials are keenly aware of their status as a middle power—as well as the strategic imperatives that flow from that status. Samuel Pinheiro
Guimarães, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Relations (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, or
Itamaraty) under President Lula, argued that “Brazil
has to articulate political, economic, and technological alliances with peripheral states of the international
system to defend and protect its interests.”40 Such a
strategy plays to Brazil’s strengths. Itamaraty is the
best diplomatic service in Latin America, and its representatives receive rigorous professional and linguistic training. (In recognition of this strength, President
Lula’s government decided to expand Itamaraty by
several hundred diplomats in 2006.) Efforts at multilateral coordination are also facilitated by President
Lula’s charisma and his credibility—especially among
the developing countries—in addressing issues like
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poverty and governance. At the broadest, systemic
level, a middle-power strategy naturally appeals to
other nations that are uncomfortable with some aspect
of American hegemony.41
During President Lula’s presidency, Brazilian diplomacy has featured at least three pronounced characteristics of a middle-power grand strategy. The first
of these involves fortifying international norms and
institutions that can act as a brake on American power. Conscious that U.S. negotiating power is diluted
when Washington has to deal with its trading partners
through international forums rather than bilateral settings, Brazilian officials have placed great importance
on broadening the basis of world trade and financial
negotiations. President Lula has diligently lobbied for
the G-8 to be replaced by the G-20, a larger group that
includes emerging countries like China, Brazil, India,
and Mexico. Similarly, his government has relied on
WTO rules and procedures to restrain what it views
as unfair trade behavior by the United States and other developed countries, and Brazil has increasingly
looked to this organization as a forum for articulating its economic interests vis-à-vis the West. This has
taken the form of positive action, as when President
Lula’s representatives led the charge for concessions
on the licensing of AIDS drugs, but it has also taken
the form of obstruction, as when Brazil used the WTO
framework to rally opposition to Western agricultural
subsidies and block the Doha Round negotiations.
“The strengthening of the multilateral trading system
is essential to those with less political and economic
leverage,” Minister Amorim explained in 2007.42
This same approach has governed President Lula’s
views on the UN and the use of force. Alarmed by
recent instances of “unilateral” U.S. military action,
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Brazilian officials have responded by seeking to deny
international legitimacy to such endeavors. In March
2003, President Lula spoke out strongly against the
impending U.S. invasion of Iraq, saying that it “disrespects the United Nations” and “doesn’t take into account what the rest of the world thinks.”43 Since then,
a central rhetorical trope of Brazilian diplomacy has
been a dogged insistence that the unilateral offensive
use of force is inherently illegitimate, and that military
intervention is warranted only when carried out under the sanction of international institutions like the
Security Council. “We reject the view of an international order which favors the use of force and regards
multilateralism as just one among many options on
the menu, to be selected when it suits the objectives
of the powerful,” says Minister Amorim.44 The Brazilian government has lent substance to this discourse by
voting against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, while
also participating in Security Council-sponsored
peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Haiti, and elsewhere. President Lula has frequently used bilateral
and multilateral communiqués to call for a revitalization of the Council’s collective security functions.45 All
this indicates a classic soft-balancing technique, one
meant to set a high threshold for the legitimacy of U.S.
military action and thereby raise the diplomatic costs
should Washington decide to employ its overwhelming military might.
A close corollary to this effort has been President
Lula’s bid to win Brazil a permanent seat on the Security Council. This desire owes mainly to hardheaded
calculations of national prestige and influence; a permanent seat would serve as a symbol of Brazil’s arrival on the global stage and permit it to shape debates
on international diplomacy and the use of force. Even
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so, President Lula has shrewdly framed this quest as
part of a broader, more altruistic campaign to make
the international order more consensual and its governing bodies more representative. The need, he said
in 2009, is “to build a new international order that is
sustainable, multilateral and less asymmetric, free of
hegemonies and ruled by democratic institutions.”
Along these lines, Brazil has played a key role in coordinating the activities of the G-4, an arrangement in
which Brazil, India, Japan, and Germany have agreed
to support one another’s bids for permanent seats on
the Security Council.46
President Lula’s reliance on the G-4 as the vehicle
for his Security Council ambitions indicates a second
aspect of Brazil’s middle-power strategy. This aspect
involves building coalitions that offset the diplomatic
and economic asymmetries of a unipolar system and
serve as force-multipliers for Brazilian influence.
President Lula has cultivated “strategic partnerships”
with a wide range of countries, including developed
middle-powers like Russia and France, as a means to
this end. Yet the foremost emphasis of his coalitionbuilding strategy has been on expanding cooperation
with other “Southern,” or developing countries.47
According to President Lula and his top advisers—
namely Minister Amorim, Marco Aurélio Garcia,
and Guimarães—the strategic interests of Brazil and
other major developing countries are fundamentally
convergent. Because Brazil is geographically removed
from countries like China and India, it need not fear
them as rivals; because these nations share Brazil’s
interest in replacing unipolarity with a more flexible
international order, they might well be its natural
diplomatic partners. “Despite the differences between
Brazil and other large peripheral states,” Guimarães
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argued in 1999, “inasmuch as they share common
characteristics and interests and are far away from one
another, they do not have direct competitive interests
and are therefore able to construct common political
projects.”48 If Brazil can give impetus to these projects,
it can increase its geopolitical leverage and position
itself as the voice of the Third World in its dealings
with the West.
The imperative of “South-South” cooperation has
given rise to a wide array of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. On the bilateral front, President Lula
has been more attentive than any of his predecessors
to the potential benefits of a closer relationship with
China, which could eventually serve as the core of an
extremely powerful Southern diplomatic or economic
bloc. Trade with China increased 12-fold between
2001 and 2009, making that country Brazil’s largest
commercial partner, and Brazil will become a major
source of oil for Beijing once the Tupi field reaches full
production. There is also a growing degree of technological and military cooperation between the two
countries, which complements the deals that President Lula has struck with Russia and France.49
A more controversial bilateral initiative is President Lula’s vocal support for the Islamic regime in
Iran. President Lula welcomed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Brazil only a few months after
the allegedly fraudulent June 2009 elections in Iran,
and he has pointedly refused to condemn Iran’s nuclear program or support a move toward UN sanctions.
In May 2010, President Lula joined with Turkish diplomats in brokering a nuclear agreement that would
allow Tehran to ship only a portion of its uranium
abroad for enrichment, a move widely seen as an effort to help Iran avoid the imposition of a new round
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of sanctions by the Security Council. While this stance
has occasioned criticism from Brazilian conservatives
and U.S. observers, President Lula appears to see good
relations with Tehran as a way of asserting Brazil’s autonomy vis-à-vis Washington, making itself a player
in Middle Eastern politics, and potentially positioning
itself as a mediator between Iran and the West—all of
which fit nicely with Brazil’s broader middle power
strategy. As Minister Amorim puts it, Iran is “the new
geographic partner in our country’s policy.”50
With respect to multilateral arrangements, President Lula’s focus on South-South diplomacy first captured global attention at the Cancun summit, part of
the Doha Round of WTO talks, in late 2003. When the
United States and the EU pressured the developing
countries to accept the “Singapore Package” (a raft
of measures pertaining to investment, competition,
trade, and transparency in government procurement,
which together constituted the core of the Doha agenda), President Lula seized the opportunity to organize
a Third-World revolt. Brazil led more than 20 developing countries in demanding that any progress on
the Singapore Package be accompanied by a rollback
of agricultural subsidies in the United States and Europe. Taking this position lent political cover to the
smaller members of the group, and after U.S. efforts
to break this front failed, the meeting ended without
agreement. More than that, the stalemate created by
Brazil’s opposition led to the breakdown of the Doha
Round, with the major participants unable to agree
even on a framework for continuing the negotiations.
(Discussions eventually resumed a year later, but the
core dispute underscored by the failure of the Cancun summit has not yet been resolved.) This deadlock
hardly benefited Brazil economically and it effectively
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stymied the world trade agenda, but it raised President Lula’s global profile and allowed him to act as
a champion of developing-country interests in subsequent trade meetings. Afterward, President Lula and
his advisers regularly referred to the Cancun summit
as a watershed in Brazilian diplomacy. “The world
saw that Brazil was able to say no,” Minister Amorim
later recalled.51
Since 2003, Brazilian officials have worked to
formalize South-South cooperation through several
overlapping initiatives. While the BRIC forum is not
technically a club of developing countries due to Russia’s inclusion, it embodies the peripheral-state ethos
at the heart of Brazilian grand strategy. President Lula
and Minister Amorim have stated on numerous occasions that they view BRIC as an emerging trade bloc
that will eventually constitute an alternative to the
Western-dominated system led by the United States
and the EU, and bilateral commerce between Brazil
and the other members has risen dramatically over
the past several years. Making BRIC a more formal
partnership is central to increasing its internal cohesion and overall geopolitical weight, and Brazilian officials have played a key role in establishing regular
ministerial meetings, summits, and working group
discussions.52
For all the attention BRIC has received, the IBSA
Dialogue Forum may be the most important piece of
Brazil’s South-South diplomacy. Founded by Brazilian
initiative in 2003, IBSA represents an explicit attempt,
as one communiqué put it, to “amplify the collective
voice of the South.”53 The group includes three of the
largest democracies in the developing world, boasting
a combined population of over 1.4 billion and an aggregate GDP of over $3 trillion, and its leaders have
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laid out an audacious program for strengthening IBSA
and increasing its international reach.54 IBSA aims to
increase trilateral trade within the group to $25 billion by 2015 and it has established nearly 20 working
groups on everything from commerce and investment
to the environment.55 The forum sponsors development projects in Guinea-Bissau and Haiti as a form of
outreach to poorer Third-World countries, and in 2008
a joint naval exercise raised the prospect of an eventual IBSA military capability. “I don’t think that a group
of sociologists meeting in a room causes such attention,” said Minister Amorim, “but a group of boats
assembling with their flags causes attention.”56 The
members have also pledged to support one another’s
Security Council ambitions and advanced common
positions on issues like nonproliferation and nuclear
energy. Brazilian officials argue that IBSA carries extra legitimacy because its members are all developing,
multicultural democracies, and comments by President Lula and Minister Amorim leave no doubt that
they view the group as an emerging axis of geopolitical and economic power. IBSA, said Minister Amorim
in 2007, is one of the tools that “can improve our negotiating capacity and help build a multi-polar world.”57
The third element of Brazil’s grand strategy takes
place at the regional rather than the global level. According to international relations theorists, middle
powers may augment their influence through a process known as “region formation,” whereby they simultaneously define their region as a distinct geopolitical entity and claim leadership status within that
entity. Doing so allows the middle power to act as
an acknowledged regional leader in global forums,
thereby improving its diplomatic credibility and negotiating capacity.58 If region formation leads to mean-
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ingful economic or political integration, it can bring
about the pooling of resources and a corresponding
increase in the aggregate geopolitical strength of both
the region and its leading power. This was the strategy followed by Charles de Gaulle when he sought
to make France the leader of a united, independent
Europe, and the same spirit has animated European
integration schemes since the early Cold War. Under
President Cardoso, and more so under President Lula,
Brazil has followed this same general template. Brazilian officials have spoken of creating a “solid regional
space” in South America, and Marco Aurélio Garcia
has advanced the notion that the continent must become an autonomous power center—presumably under Brasilia’s leadership. “We are marching toward a
multipolar world,” he said in 2009, “and South America will be one of those poles.”59
The imperative of asserting Brazilian leadership
has become all the more important in view of the contested geopolitical environment in South America.
Recent U.S. policy toward Latin America has arguably
been one of benign neglect, but Washington has nonetheless signed free trade agreements and strengthened
relations with key countries like Chile, Colombia, and
Peru. More pressing still is the issue of Venezuela,
which under President Hugo Chávez has staked its
own claim to regional leadership. Through projects
like PetroCaribe and the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas (ALBA, formerly the Bolivarian Alternative
for the Americas), extensive aid to populist politicians
in other countries, and the acquisition of advanced
weapons systems from Russia and other suppliers,
President Chávez has shown that he intends to make
Venezuela the dominant power in South America. In
public, Brazilian officials insist that they do not view
President Chávez as a threat, but in private, they
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seem to recognize that his bid for regional leadership
places Brazil in a difficult position. Openly confronting President Chávez would polarize the ideological
and diplomatic climate in South America, destroying
any chance for a more unified—and thus more influential—region. Yet taking too passive a stance risks allowing President Chávez to accumulate influence and
isolate Brazil.60
Brazil has therefore taken an indirect approach
to containing President Chávez. In public, President
Lula has placated the Venezuelan leader and sought
to mediate his disputes with Colombia’s Álvaro Uribe
and other conservative leaders. More quietly, Brazil
has attempted to consolidate its position in the region
by strengthening ties with a range of countries, including those that make up President Chávez’s core
diplomatic constituency. President Lula has called
for a “strategic partnership” with Argentina, a longstanding rival that has traditionally viewed Brazilian
influence with suspicion. Likewise, his government
has expanded counternarcotics assistance to Bolivia,
donated decommissioned airplanes or helicopters to
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and used a SIVAM
surveillance aircraft to help Peru resolve a hostage
crisis in 2003. As part of an initiative begun prior to
President Lula’s presidency, Brazil has also made a
virtue of its reliance on natural gas imports. Brazil cosponsored construction of a gas pipeline running from
Bolivia to Brazil, ensuring that the Bolivian gas industry has become dependent on the Brazilian market,
and President Lula acquiesced in the nationalization
of Brazilian-owned gas assets in Bolivia in 2006. The
list of initiatives goes on; efforts to balance President
Chávez and expand Brazilian influence have given
President Lula’s regional policy a hyperactive quality.61
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As this diplomacy indicates, Brazil is aiming for
what one scholar calls “consensual hegemony.”62 Brazilian officials seek to portray their country’s diplomacy as a benign, unthreatening project so as to avoid
reviving traditional fears of a hegemonic Brazil and
thereby driving South American countries toward Caracas or Washington. (How successful they have been
in doing so is open to dispute.) Accordingly, for Brazil
to achieve effective regional leadership, it will have to
forge consensual arrangements that provide its neighbors with economic and political benefits while drawing them deeper into the Brazilian orbit.
This strategy has driven the central thrust of Brazilian regional diplomacy under President Lula—his
unceasing emphasis on South American integration.
Regional integration is the keystone of consensual
hegemony—forging deeper political and economic
ties with South American countries will create a more
powerful continental bloc, while binding these nations
more closely to the most powerful member of that
bloc. Early in his presidency, President Lula called regional integration “a strategic option to strengthen the
insertion of our countries in the world, increasing their
negotiating capacity,” and Brazilian officials have frequently invoked the EU as an example of what they
aim to accomplish.63
The centerpiece of this effort has traditionally been
Mercosul, the trade and customs pact originally established with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay 2
decades ago. When President Lula came to power, he
said that fortifying Mercosul would be a top priority.
Since then, his government has broached various options for deepening economic ties within the pact and
called for broadening its membership and responsibilities. Mercosul now has working groups to deal with
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organized crime, terrorism, and other security issues;
it has taken on observers (Mexico) and associate members (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru);
and Venezuela was granted full membership in 2006
(pending approval by the Paraguayan and Brazilian
legislatures). This latter decision was highly controversial, but President Lula’s government deemed it necessary to increase the share of South American trade
commanded by the agreement, harness the influence
provided by Venezuelan oil reserves, and hopefully
moderate President Chávez’s efforts to undercut Brazilian diplomacy. President Lula has high hopes for
Mercosul; he has pushed for a free trade agreement
between Mercosul and the EU and worked to defeat
rival projects like the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA).64
Due to frictions within Mercosul (discussed in
greater detail below), President Lula has also pursued
parallel integration projects. The Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) project
features a web of transportation corridors, energy conduits, and other projects designed to facilitate flows of
goods and people across the continent’s rugged terrain. While President Chávez has been very active in
promoting this project, Brazilian officials appear to
calculate that his enthusiasm will simply defray the
cost of an initiative that will inevitably redound to the
benefit of the continent’s largest economy. Complementing IIRSA is the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a relatively new body that Brazilian
diplomats view as a forum for dispute resolution and,
eventually, cooperation on a range of political and
security issues. UNASUR is particularly attractive to
Brasilia because it offers a multilateral forum for managing President Chávez’s intermittent outbursts and

28

provocations, and because it excludes Washington
and thereby makes Brazil the dominant player.65
Brazilian officials thus envision integration as a
multistep, multilevel process that will eventually encompass political and security issues as well as economic and commercial affairs. “The first stage is commercial integration,” said one Defense Ministry official
in 2004. “After that comes the macroeconomic one,
and the military stage will be the roof of the edifice.”66
Brazilian officials portrayed the UN stabilization mission in Haiti as an embryo for South American defense
cooperation, and President Lula was the driving force
behind the creation of the South American Defense
Council (CDS). The CDS is a still-nascent project that
may eventually lead to more military-to-military contacts, more combined exercises, more collaboration on
drug trafficking and other common threats, and less
U.S. influence in South American defense affairs. “The
geopolitical stance [the region] confronts,” Minister
Jobim said in March 2008, “whether we admit it or
not, is the set of old continental concepts emanating
from the U.S.” Just as important, Brazil sees CDS as a
first step toward creating a regional defense industry.
Combined with Brazil’s growing technological capabilities, progress on this front will allow Brasilia to become a major supplier to South American militaries,
with all the influence that entails.67
EVALUATING BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND DILEMMAS
President Lula’s grand strategy has thus featured
a sophisticated, multipronged approach to international affairs. It has also featured a seemingly unshakeable confidence that the geopolitical scales are
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tilting sharply in Brazil’s favor. Brazil was not “born
to spend its whole life as an emerging country,” said
President Lula in 2003. “I am not going to throw away
this chance.”68
Certainly, Brazil’s geopolitical position is much
stronger than that of just a decade ago, and President
Lula’s diplomatic activism has had much to do with
this. His efforts to coordinate Third World positions in
the WTO have made Brazil an increasingly powerful
player in that body, allowing it to block trade measures deemed disadvantageous to its interests and win
concessions on issues such as licensing of AIDS drugs.
The G-20 has effectively replaced the G-8 as the primary forum for international economic discussions,
and President Lula’s outspoken participation in these
debates is a chief reason why Brazil is set to translate
its growing economic power into a larger voting share
in the IMF and World Bank in 2011. In addition, closer
attention to relations with China, France, and other
“strategic partners” has helped diversify Brazilian
commerce and enabled upgrades in Brazil’s military,
technological, and defense-industrial capabilities.
Brazil’s international image has also undergone a
striking transformation. A decade ago, it was highly
implausible that Brazil would soon be recognized as
an emerging great power. In the time since, President
Lula has positioned Brazil as a leading moderate critic
of U.S. hegemony, raised his country’s profile through
participation in forums like BRIC and IBSA, and used
Brazil’s status as a democratic developing country to
accrue significant diplomatic capital. Through his frenetic diplomacy and cultivation of numerous strategic
relationships, President Lula seems already to have
achieved what many past Brazilian leaders aspired
to—general recognition that their country is a key
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player in the international balance. “Who today could
imagine solving the problems of the world without
Brazil?” asked France’s Nikolas Sarkozy in 2008.
Similarly, in 2008 then-U.S. assistant secretary of state
Thomas Shannon commented that in the 21st century,
“how we work with Brazil is going to be as important
as how we work with China and how we work with
India.” Given Brazil’s longstanding quest for stature,
these comments represent no mean achievement on
President Lula’s part.69
Finally, President Lula’s diplomacy has created a
web of relationships that his successors may be able to
exploit. At the regional level, the creation of UNASUR
and CSD and the expansion of Mercosul have, at the
very least, provided the institutional basis for future
integration under Brazilian auspices. At the global
level, the IBSA and BRIC forums provide settings for
the potential consolidation and expansion of SouthSouth ties, and President Lula’s various strategic
partnerships offer avenues for strengthening relations
with other middle powers and emerging nations. If
nothing else, President Lula will leave the presidents
that come after him with a wide array of possibilities
and significant diplomatic flexibility.
Yet a sober evaluation of President Lula’s policies
must deal with their weaknesses as well as their accomplishments. While Brazilian foreign policy has
seemingly gone from success to success over the past
several years, over the medium and long term, the
country faces four potent grand strategic dilemmas
that could compromise its influence or otherwise complicate its ascent.
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Economic, Social, and Political Constraints.
The first of these dilemmas has less to do with
the particularities of President Lula’s grand strategy
than with the internal dynamics—political, social, and
economic—required to sustain a forceful, effective diplomacy. Macroeconomic strength, internal cohesion,
and a political system capable of producing these attributes are base-level conditions for generating national
power in the global system. In certain respects, Brazil
seems well positioned to meet this challenge over the
long term, especially when compared to other middle
powers and emerging states. Unlike China or Russia,
Brazil has a genuine, multiparty democracy. Unlike
India, its society is not blighted by persistent communal or religious violence. While Brazil cannot compete
economically with China or the United States, the last
two Brazilian presidential administrations have done
quite well in maintaining economic stability, lowering
poverty through targeted social spending, and enabling greater domestic consumption. The validity of
the Brazilian economic model seemed to be confirmed
in 2008-09, as several studies showed that the middle
class had grown to encompass roughly half the population. More recently, Brazil was one of the last nations
to go into recession as a result of the global financial
crisis and one of the first to come out.70
Yet there is a compelling case to be made that Brazil has not yet achieved the strong, sustained growth
necessary to match the expansive ambitions that have
driven its grand strategy over the past decade. Since
the debt crisis of the 1980s, Brazil has been an economic laggard in terms of overall growth rates. According
to the World Bank, GDP grew at just 1.9 percent from
1987-97 and 2.8 percent from 1997-2007, considerably
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slower than the average rate for Latin American countries and for the broader developing world.71 Brazilian
growth rates improved in 2007 and 2008 and recent oil
discoveries have fueled immense economic optimism,
but the long-term trend lines are still unclear. Projections that Brazil will become the fifth-largest economy
in the world by 2050 are based on the presumption
that, through good policy and good fortune, the country’s economy will grow substantially faster than it
has over the past 2 decades. According to Roopa Puroshothaman, whose 2003 paper popularized the term
“BRICs,” “Brazil’s performance would have to improve quite significantly relative to the past” in order
to meet this expectation.72
Brazil’s slower-than-desired growth is often attributed to high interest rates, which have remained
elevated as a guard against inflation. The problem,
however, runs much deeper than this. The Brazilian
economy has traditionally been constrained by a maze
of regulation and red tape, and even with recent reforms, there remain immense barriers to the sort of entrepreneurial activity that produces sustained growth.
On nearly every major marker of entrepreneurial competitiveness—tax rates, time spent paying taxes, time
spent dealing with government officials, the number
of days and permits required to start a business, time
required to clear direct imports and exports through
customs, and many others—the Brazilian economy
rates considerably worse than the Latin American
average. Payroll taxes reach a stifling 60 percent, discouraging expansion and pushing many small and
medium enterprises into the informal sector, where
they are locked out of formal capital markets and do
not contribute to the government’s fiscal base.73 The
advantage of high tax rates is that they have allowed
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Brazil to mobilize a comparatively large chunk of GDP
for government use; the downside is that these high
costs and cumbersome regulations have restricted innovation and allowed the perpetuation of a bloated,
inefficient bureaucracy. Additionally, Brazil’s longterm potential for growth is limited by the fact that
educational reforms have not kept pace with other
social programs, and so while more children are attending school, they are not necessarily acquiring the
knowledge or skills that will allow them to become
more productive than their parents.74
Infrastructural deficiencies pose an additional
challenge. Brazil’s ability to export efficiently, as well
as to develop its large internal market, is hindered by
the immense difficulty of transporting goods across
the country’s rough terrain. The rail system is underdeveloped, and as of 2004, only some 10 percent of the
country’s 1.74 million kilometers of roads were paved
(and more than half of that 10 percent were one-lane
roads). The ports are outdated and over-saturated,
despite the modernization program launched under
President Cardoso, meaning that stocks often sit on
the docks for 3 weeks or more before being shipped.
All this deters export-oriented firms from expanding
and thereby creating new jobs and greater prosperity.75
Economists generally agree that addressing these
problems will require sizable investments in education and infrastructure and, more importantly, major structural reforms designed to spur innovation,
decrease regulation, and lessen the burdens of doing
business. Unfortunately, the current characteristics of
the political system conspire against such measures.
The electoral system over-represents small parties
with parochial interests, making it all the more diffi-
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cult to forge the broad coalitions necessary to support
sweeping structural changes. Corruption remains
rampant, as illustrated by two massive payoff scandals during President Lula’s first term, and powerful
interests such as government bureaucracies and stateowned companies like Petrobras have a vested interest in preserving the status quo.76 All this has weakened the impetus for structural reform, and according
to one leading survey, Brazil is actually getting worse
in terms of economic competitiveness. Brazil fell from
127th to 129th in “ease of doing business” from 2009
to 2010, and it suffered similar declines with respect
to “ease of paying taxes” and “ease of starting a business.”77 The macroeconomic consequences of this
weakness have so far been mitigated by large government stimulus packages, but Brazil’s declining competitiveness and failure to implement the required
reforms speak ill of its long-term economic prospects.
If Brazil cannot achieve and sustain higher levels of
growth, it could eventually face several barriers to its
geopolitical designs. Low growth rates would mean
fewer resources for military modernization, development projects, and diplomatic initiatives abroad. They
could also sap the national confidence that President
Lula has tapped into, causing Brazilian politicians to
argue that the country should concentrate on getting
its own affairs in order. This may already be happening, in fact; José Serra, the presidential candidate put
forward by the centrist Brazilian Social Democratic
Party—PSDB—has argued for a more restrained foreign policy and greater attention to economic and
political problems at home. Finally, because robust
economic growth will be necessary to bring about
additional reductions in poverty, a Brazil that lags in
these categories could face resurgent class and social
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cleavages that might limit its internal cohesion—and
thus its geopolitical potential.78 Oil money may ease
some of these potential dislocations, but given price
volatility, relying primarily on an expected petroleum
windfall is a gamble, not a strategy.
The economy is not the only internal issue that
could retard Brazil’s ascent. The country also faces a
stern test of its domestic security capabilities in the
form of the large, well-armed gangs that dominate
huge stretches of major cities like Rio de Janeiro and
Sao Paulo. These gangs generally have ties to the drug
trade and a variety of illicit economic networks, and
in many favelas they are so powerful that police, reporters, and other unwelcome visitors enter only at
the risk of death. The potentially devastating impact
of this insecurity came into sharp relief in May 2006,
when hundreds of attacks by one such gang, the First
Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo, resulted in
dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in damages,
and threw South America’s largest city into chaos.
“The sad reality,” remarked one observer “is that the
state is now the prisoner of the PCC.”79
Crime detracts from economic performance, because it forces both public and private institutions to
channel resources to security-related initiatives rather
than development-oriented endeavors. It also accentuates festering social divisions. The rich can afford
protection—living in gated communities, hiring security guards, and bulletproofing their cars. The poor, by
contrast, must live with insecurity and make accommodations with whatever criminal group dominates
the neighborhood. All this reinforces deep-seated social inequities, lessens the prospects for greater social
cohesion, and detracts from the legitimacy of the democratic state. If crime continues unchecked, it may be-
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come more common to hear Brazilians ask why their
country should worry about projecting power abroad
when it cannot even control its territory or protect its
citizens at home. This question will be even harder to
answer if President Lula’s successors cannot resolve
the other dilemmas his grand strategy entails.
Region Formation: Costs and Contradictions.
Perhaps the most important of these dilemmas
involves Brazil’s region-formation efforts. For all of
President Lula’s attempts to build a consensus behind
the idea of Brazilian leadership in South America,
bilateral disputes and a general sense of unease still
pervade Brazil’s relations with many neighbors. There
are recurring tensions with Paraguay over the Itaipú
hydroelectric project, with Ecuador over Brazilian investments in that country, and with Bolivia over its oil
and gas industries. Venezuela has continually sought
to hijack the regional diplomatic agenda, sometimes
through meetings of UNASUR and CSD, bodies that
President Lula played a key role in creating. Even
more revealing, key regional players like Colombia
and Argentina have consistently opposed President
Lula’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council, with the Argentine foreign minister calling Brazil’s
position on this issue “elitist and not very democratic.”80 Brazilian officials may talk about forging “strategic partnerships” with their neighbors, but President
Lula’s efforts to claim regional leadership still inspire
more hostility than support.
Some of this resistance is simply a residue of longstanding diplomatic rivalries. Given Brazil’s history of
predominance in South America, it is only natural that
President Lula’s counterparts have been uncomfort-
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able with his increasing assertiveness. Also, in light
of President Chávez’s determination to claim regional
leadership for himself, a degree of conflict between
Caracas and Brasilia should be expected.
Yet the travails of Brazil’s South American diplomacy also reveal a fundamental contradiction within
President Lula’s region formation project—the fact
that Brazil has so far been unwilling to pay the costs
associated with achieving this objective. As several
political scientists have noted, region formation is
inherently an expensive and burdensome undertaking. For a middle power to be accepted as a regional
leader, it must provide meaningful benefits to the
smaller countries whose support it desires to enlist.
These benefits can come in the form of public goods
like military security, or they may be economic transfers to offset the asymmetries—the uneven accrual of
gains to the larger members—that inevitably accompany economic integration projects. Additionally, to
convince its neighbors that region formation is not
simply domination in another guise, middle powers are generally well advised to surrender some of
their own sovereignty to judicial or legislative bodies
charged with resolving regional disputes. In its crudest terms, region formation is therefore a transactional
relationship that imposes real costs—whether military, economic, or other—on the aspiring power.81
Under President Cardoso and President Lula,
the Brazilian political class has refused to make this
commitment. For all the talk of building relationships within South America, there remains a fear in
Brazilian foreign policy circles that neighboring countries may exploit insecurity in the Amazon for their
own ends. More important, because political elites
are so focused on promoting and sustaining Brazil’s
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economic development, the majority have shown
little interest in schemes that would divert Brazilian
resources to fostering the development of neighboring countries. Brazil still offers much less in the way
of economic aid or preferential trade deals than does
Venezuela. Brazilian officials have also sought to
keep the price that Brazil pays for Bolivian gas and
Paraguayan hydroelectric power below market rates,
despite the frustration this policy has produced in
those countries. Even as Brazilian diplomats have
called for closer commercial ties with South America,
the industrial and manufacturing communities have
resisted tariff reductions (within Mercosul as well as
in bilateral trading relationships) that would open the
economy to greater competition and thereby impinge
upon their own interests. The net result of all this has
been to ensure that even as President Lula argues that
economic and political integration will be good for the
region as a whole, many of Brazil’s neighbors remain
unconvinced.82
This situation is most pronounced within Mercosul, where Brazil has strongly resisted demands for
greater power sharing and a more equitable distribution of economic gains. Since its founding, Mercosul has been plagued by a fundamental asymmetry:
Because Brazil’s economy dwarfs that of the other
members, these countries run huge trade deficits with
Brasilia. This “original sin” has long provoked discontent within the group, but Brazilian officials have
been understandably loath to assuage these concerns
if it means surrendering their country’s economic advantage.83 Brazilian industrialists decry any proposal
to make trade concessions to other Mercosul members. A “convergence fund” known as the Fundo para
a Convergência Estrutural e Fortalecimento Institucional
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do Mercosul (FOCEM) was recently created to pay for
development projects within the bloc, but it is widely
acknowledged to be inadequate.84 President Lula did
take a meaningful step toward righting persistent
economic asymmetries when he signed an agreement
giving Paraguay a greater share of the benefits from
the Itaipú dam, but it soon became clear that the Brazilian Senate had no intention of approving the pact.
Nor has Brazil agreed to the establishment of strong
arbitration mechanisms that would wield supranational authority over Mercosul members, something
that Uruguay and Paraguay insist is crucial to ensuring a fairer distribution of trade and economic gains.85
When it comes to regional integration, President Lula’s diplomats talk in terms of the common good, but
their actions bespeak a more parochial commitment to
Brazilian self-interest.
As a result, Mercosul has hardly lived up to its
billing as the centerpiece of President Lula’s regional
diplomacy. With Brazil unwilling to take the lead in
redressing inequities within the pact, there has been
regress rather than progress in efforts to deepen regional economic integration. Nontariff barriers are on
the rise and Mercosul members have carved out exceptions to tariff reductions to protect favored economic
sectors. Paraguay refuses to do away with the “double
charge” (charging a tariff on goods that entered the
trade zone through another member country) because
its leaders reason that Brazil and Argentina will not
help them compensate for the loss of customs revenue.86 There is no effective mechanism for resolving
intra-bloc disputes; Mercosul’s governing institutions
are so weak that Argentina and Uruguay took a recent
economic disagreement to the International Court of
Justice for adjudication. Not surprisingly, dissatis-
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faction with the pact is mounting among its smaller
members. Uruguayan officials have openly discussed
leaving Mercosul in favor of a free trade agreement
with the United States, and Paraguayan commentators have called Mercosul “fat, useless, and interfering.” Argentina has also expressed displeasure with
Brazilian trade policies.87 In concept, Mercosul may be
the foundation for Brazil’s consensual hegemony project, but in practice, it is an increasingly fractious and
hollow organization.
The same dynamic is playing out across the region,
where there is a strong sense that Brazil is trying to
establish a dominant position without providing anything in return. The leaders of Chile and Argentina
voiced precisely this complaint when they quit a Brazilian-led summit in 2005. According to one account,
“Argentine President Nestor Kirchner stormed away
from the meeting room with loud complaints about
Brazil’s unwillingness to shoulder the costs of leading.”88 Because Brazil is not seen to be contributing to
the common good, South American officials tend to
see its drive for greater international power as threatening rather than reassuring. Several countries along
Brazil’s Amazonian frontiers have expressed concern
with President Lula’s military buildup; Bolivian vicepresident Álvaro Garcia Linera said that it was Brasilia,
rather than Washington, that posed the greatest threat
to his country.89 Brazilian officials have exacerbated
the bad feelings with a series of missteps, including
accidental military incursions into Paraguay and the
holding of a war game clearly meant to intimidate the
Paraguayan government around the time of the Itaipú
negotiations in mid-2009.90
Because Brazil has failed to bring its mooted South
American constituency into line, it has struggled to
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defeat rival leadership projects in the region. While
President Chávez is not well liked in many South
American countries, discomfort with President Lula’s
foreign policies has helped create a vacuum that the
Venezuelan leader has been able to fill with his petroleum diplomacy. Bolivia and Ecuador have become
members of ALBA, and President Chávez’s purchase
of billions of dollars of Argentine debt has given him
some influence with that country. On the other side
of the political spectrum, a group of nations led by
Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico is pursuing a project known as the Pacific Arc, which can be seen as an
effort to balance against both Venezuela and Brazil.91
Many of these same countries—most notably Colombia and Peru—have also moved closer to the United
States, and Uruguayan president Tabaré Vázquez sent
a shock through Mercosul in 2006-07 when he indicated that he wished to sign an FTA with Washington (he ultimately settled for a trade and investment
framework accord).92
In short, Brazilian officials can hardly claim that
South America is united, much less that it is united behind Brazilian leadership. If President Lula’s successors do not make Brazil’s bid for regional hegemony
more attractive to its neighbors, they too will find it
difficult to establish a strong power base in Brazil’s
backyard.
Global Coalitions and Strategic Partnerships:
Tensions and Limitations.
The third dilemma has to do with the strategic
partnerships and global coalitions that President Lula
has sought to establish. As discussed previously, the
rationale for this activity has been that these groups
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will broaden Brazil’s strategic options, provide leverage in dealing with the United States and the West,
and allow Brazilian officials to position themselves as
spokesmen for the developing world. This strategy
has racked up some initial successes over the past
several years. Looking ahead, however, there are serious questions as to whether these partnerships will be
cohesive or effective enough to serve as meaningful
force-multipliers for Brazilian diplomatic influence.
Consider, for instance, President Lula’s efforts to
build international support for his Security Council
campaign through a variety of bilateral and multilateral endeavors. Groups like the G-4 and IBSA have
made Security Council reform a defining theme of
their diplomacy, and individual countries like France
and the United Kingdom have pledged their backing
for Brazil’s candidacy. Yet Brazil still faces considerable challenges in achieving permanent membership,
and not only because Security Council reform is inherently fraught with difficulty. Brazil’s bid lacks credibility due to the fact that major Latin American countries—Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia—oppose it,
and President Lula has encountered foot-dragging
and obstinacy from several of his strategic partners
as well. The Russian government is loath to dilute its
global influence by expanding one of the relatively
few elite international clubs to which it still belongs.93
China is unalterably opposed to the program of the
G-4, owing to Beijing’s long-standing antipathy toward Japan and its continuing rivalry with India. So
far, Brazilian diplomats have failed to budge Beijing
from this stance. When President Lula designated
China a full market economy in 2004 in order to ease
restrictions on Chinese imports, the expected payoff,
Chinese support for Brazil’s Security Council bid, was
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not forthcoming. Solidarity among the rising powers
is one thing; cold national interest is another.94
This split between Russia, Brazil, and China casts
doubt on the notion that the peripheral powers are
natural allies in their struggle against U.S. hegemony.
It also touches on the limited cohesiveness of the BRIC
forum. Although BRIC serves as an attractive academic paradigm for grouping several rising states, the
frenzy of BRIC diplomacy and summitry over the past
several years has in many ways obscured the fact that
the group is beset by numerous fissures. Its members
have widely divergent conceptions of governance and
legitimacy, raising questions as to the compatibility of
their long-term visions of the international order. The
four economies are also less complementary than is often supposed.95 Brazilian manufacturers have already
identified Chinese imports as an unwelcome source
of low-priced competition, leading President Lula’s
government to impose new restrictions on Chinese
goods. Furthermore, Brazilian economic officials are
finding that they face the same problem that has long
bedeviled their American counterparts: that China’s
efforts to keep its currency low hurt Brazilian exports
and make it more difficult to Brazilian industries to
compete with Chinese imports.96 As these frictions indicate, while bilateral trade between the various BRIC
countries has risen substantially, the trade policies of
these nations remain quite disparate. This being the
case, predictions that the group is on its way to becoming a functioning trade bloc or an alternative center of economic gravity are premature.
Even if Brazil can maintain strong bilateral ties with
Russia, China, and India—and as the above indicates,
this outcome is hardly assured—the BRIC group as
a whole will likely become more fractious over time.
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India, Russia, and China are natural rivals rather than
natural partners, given their geographic proximity to
one another, and competition within this subgroup is
already on the rise. Many Russian strategists see the
growing strategic, economic, and demographic challenge from China as more threatening than anything
in Moscow’s relations with the United States.97 Indian
officials are hardly sanguine about China’s search for
a port on the Indian Ocean (especially given that this
search is leading Beijing toward India’s rival, Pakistan, and its authoritarian neighbor, Myanmar) and
the need to obtain oil supplies from Africa could soon
emerge as another point of friction.98 As the individual
BRIC countries—especially China and India—become
more powerful, they will probably become more assertive in pressing their particular national interests,
which may bode ill for intra-group harmony. Peering
out over the next decade and beyond, BRIC looks like
a shaky foundation upon which to base any coalitionbuilding strategy.
In some ways, IBSA seems to be a more realistic
option. Its members are all multicultural democracies,
and the geographical distance between them dampens potential intragroup rivalries. Here too, rhetoric
has outpaced reality in terms of both internal cohesion and concrete diplomatic or economic accomplishment. It is highly questionable whether IBSA can gain
acceptance as the voice of the developing nations;
calls to “democratize” international institutions ring
hollow with many of the Third World countries that
the group claims to represent. The prospect that the
IBSA three might achieve permanent standing on the
Security Council seems decidedly undemocratic and
even threatening to countries like Nigeria, Pakistan,
Argentina, and Colombia.99
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On the economic front, trade between members
has soared over the past decade, and there is room
for greater cooperation on issues like energy and investment. There are also, however, high barriers to
meaningful economic or trade integration. The dearth
of transportation links between the three countries
makes shipping expensive and lessens comparative
advantage.100 While this issue can potentially be resolved over time, it may be more difficult to overcome
the policy differences that separate the IBSA countries. India’s economy is protected by much higher
tariff barriers than either Brazil’s or South Africa’s,
and despite Minister Amorim’s claim that IBSA can
“speak with one voice” on economic matters, India
and Brazil have conflicting interests on issues like agricultural policy. This has already led to splits within
the group, with these two countries coming down on
opposite sides of the issue at the failed Doha Round
trade talks in 2008.101
To its credit, IBSA has been able to minimize disputes over issues like nuclear energy and nonproliferation. These compromises give some hope that the
group will be able to maintain its internal cohesion and
focus on the overriding objective of diversifying the
global power balance. As with BRIC however, there
is a degree of long-term strategic divergence at work
within IBSA. The current Indian government clearly
calculates that a closer partnership with the United
States is important to achieving India’s regional and
global aims, as shown by the recent U.S.-India nuclear
agreement and the subsequent tightening of relations
with Washington. Moreover, as the breakdown in
IBSA solidarity at the Doha Round talks in 2008 demonstrated, to the extent that these rising powers feel
strong enough to stake out independent positions in
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international negotiations, they will probably feel less
compelled to sacrifice their own interests in the name
of Third-World cohesion. This does not mean that
IBSA is doomed to irrelevance, but it does mean that
solidifying this partnership will demand significant
commitment and concessions from the three members.
As for President Lula’s burgeoning relationship
with Iran, the putative benefits of this initiative—a
greater voice in Middle Eastern diplomacy, an opportunity to serve as a mediator between Tehran and the
West, a chance to strengthen Third-World solidarity
and assert Brazil’s diplomatic autonomy vis-à-vis the
United States—are more compelling in theory than
in practice. It is hard to image that President Lula’s
warm treatment of President Ahmadinejad will lead
to greater Brazilian influence with the Sunni Muslim
and Arab states that occupy the vast majority if the
Middle East. Nor is this partnership good for Brazil’s
image. The more President Lula defends the human
rights practices and electoral legitimacy of the Iranian
regime, the more he risks compromising the democratic credentials that have served him so well.102 Then
there are the implications for what is still Brazil’s most
important diplomatic relationship—its conflicted
partnership with the United States.
Brazil-U.S. Relations: Partnership or Rivalry?
Since the mid-20th century, U.S.-Brazilian relations have typically featured a mix of conflict and collaboration. During World War II, Getulio Vargas sent
Brazilian troops to fight alongside the Allies in Italy,
albeit after securing promises of U.S. economic aid as
the price for doing so. In the 1960s and 1970s, the pronounced anti-communism of Brazil’s military govern-
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ments (particularly that of Emilio Garrastazu Médici)
conduced to a common interest in keeping the radical
Left out of power in Latin America. “I wish he were
running the whole continent,” Richard Nixon said of
Médici in 1971.103 At the same time, Brazilian leaders were wary of being seen as Washington’s lackey,
compelling them to put distance between themselves
and their U.S. counterparts. They chafed at American
efforts to interfere in Brazilian politics, especially criticism of the military governments, as well as Washington’s attempts to slow the postwar diffusion of global
power. Brazilian governments refused to sign the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through the 1980s,
resisted American pressure on human rights issues
under the Carter administration, and found numerous
other ways to assert their diplomatic autonomy.104
A similar ambivalence characterizes current U.S.Brazil relations. At the strategic level, the two countries have broadly congruent interests. Both Washington and Brasilia desire stability in Latin America and
in the larger international arena. Both countries believe in the benefits of a liberal economic order, even if
they differ on what exactly that order should look like.
Both nations have democratic political systems, and
both would be threatened should authoritarian states
in Europe or Asia come to dominate the international
order. With respect to the contemporary setting in
Latin America, both Brazil and the United States have
a vested interest in containing authoritarian populism
and seeing that Chávez does not emerge as the preeminent regional statesman.
These shared interests have led to bilateral cooperation—or at least accommodation—on several important issues. Collaboration on counterterrorism and
organized crime issues has generally been good. In
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2007, Presidents Lula and George W. Bush signed an
agreement to promote the development of a regional
biofuels capacity as a counterweight to President
Chávez’s petro-influence. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Christopher McMullen pointed to President
Lula’s administration as an exemplar of responsible,
left-of-center governance in Latin America, calling it
“a model for countries in the region” and a “natural
regional leader and global partner.”105 For his part,
President Lula has sharply criticized numerous aspects of U.S. policy in Latin America, but he has simultaneously worked to defeat the more radical positions
taken by President Chávez and his allies. President
Lula pushed hard for an end to the U.S. embargo
against Cuba in the run-up to a regional summit in
June 2009, for instance, but he ultimately helped broker a compromise that bridged the U.S. position and
that of countries like Venezuela and Honduras.106 At
the level of public diplomacy, President Lula has enjoyed warm personal relationships with both former
President George Bush and President Barrack Obama,
and U.S. officials have been at pains to emphasize the
common interests that unite the two countries.107 Military cooperation has grown, with both countries providing students, visitors and lecturers to each other’s
conferences and educational institutions.
Yet there is also a growing degree of conflict inherent in President Lula’s foreign policy and the growth
of Brazilian power. At the most parochial level, the
need to placate the more left-wing elements of President Lula’s Workers Party (PT) coalition has occasionally compelled the president to make anti-imperialist,
anti-U.S. themes prominent in his public discourse.108
More substantively, many Brazilian observers believe
that the current rules of international trade and finance
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are prejudicial to their country’s development, and
that these rules are thus in need of revision. And in
the broadest geopolitical sense, Brazil simply cannot
achieve the increased influence it seeks—whether in
South America or the larger global system—without
weakening that of the dominant power in these environments. Ten years ago, Brazilian officials tended to
make this point obliquely; under President Lula, they
have made it more explicitly. In 2008, Ambassador
Antonio Patriota told a U.S. audience that “the days
of the Monroe Doctrine are over,” and other commentators have taken an even more confrontational
tone. “Brazil is at war,” opined the Folha de Sao Paulo,
a nationalist newspaper. “A diplomatic war, with a
clear strategy and coherent tactics, against the unipolar world. Nothing personal against the United States,
but entirely against a single power hovering above all,
in every area.”109
Quietly but unmistakably, this strategic tension
has moved to the center of U.S.-Brazil relations. As
discussed above, Brazilian diplomats have emerged as
foils for their U.S. counterparts in international trade
forums, often serving as focal points for resistance to
Washington’s proposals. President Lula seized the
Iraq war as an opportunity to rally diplomatic opposition to U.S. hegemony, a project he has since continued through IBSA, BRIC, and other forums. At the
bilateral level, President Lula continually proclaims
the injustice of the U.S. tariff on ethanol imports, and
this issue intrudes on virtually every encounter between high-level officials. As Brazil has become more
confident, it has also become more defiant, and this is
ineluctably causing friction with the United States.110
This same tendency is also apparent within South
America, where the shared imperative of containing
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President Chávez has masked the increasingly competitive tenor of U.S.-Brazilian relations. President
Lula’s opposition to the FTAA derived largely from
the fear that the project would link South American
countries to the U.S. economy and thereby break up
the “solid, regional space” that his administration
aimed to construct.111 Similarly, the creation of institutions like UNASUR and CSD must be seen as efforts
to balance U.S. influence in South America by making
Brazil, rather than Washington, the region’s dominant
interlocutor on political and defense matters. Along
these lines, Brasilia has worked to limit the U.S. defense presence in the region. President Lula sharply
criticized the U.S.-Colombia basing deal signed in
2009, and at a UNASUR meeting shortly thereafter,
he led several countries in trying to limit the type of
activities that could be carried out at the bases. “Dear
friend Obama,” he remarked, “we don’t need U.S.
bases in Colombia to fight drug trafficking in South
America. We can take care of fighting drug trafficking
within our borders and you must take care of your
drug users.”112 The “reactivation” of the U.S. 4th Fleet
in 2008 also caused a strong response, with President
Lula speculating that American naval forces constituted a threat to Brazil’s offshore oil reserves.113 Brazil
seeks to displace the United States as the dominant
power in South America, and this objective brings
with it an elevated risk of bilateral conflict.
This budding rivalry has recently spilled over into
Central America, even though Brazil has little hope of
competing with U.S. economic and political sway on
the isthmus. In 2009, President Lula took exception to
what he perceived as Washington’s insufficient interest in reversing the coup against Manuel Zelaya in
Honduras. Marco Aurélio Garcia criticized President
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Obama for declining to “put more pressure on the
putschists,” and President Lula eventually assumed
a key role in the crisis by permitting—perhaps reluctantly—Zelaya to take refuge in the Brazilian embassy
in Tegucigalpa. U.S. officials believed that this decision simply complicated prospects for a negotiated
settlement to the crisis, and the State Department issued a pointed—if elliptical—critique of Brazilian
policy. Brazil subsequently refused to recognize the
democratically elected government that took power
following elections in late 2009, although the realization that this would do nothing to change the situation
on the ground has since convinced President Lula to
soften his stance.114
The divergence of U.S. and Brazilian policies is
most evident with respect to Iran, which is rapidly
becoming one of the more contentious issues in the relationship. U.S. officials do not view President Lula’s
engagement strategy kindly and worry that Brazil is
granting Tehran international legitimacy at a most
inopportune time. Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY),
head of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee in the
House of Representatives, gave voice to this worry,
calling President Lula’s decision to play host to President Ahmadinejad in late 2009 “a gross error, a terrible mistake.” “It makes you wonder if Brazil is really
ready for the new era of global relations it envisions,”
he said.115 None of this has fazed President Lula. What
is remarkable about the Brazilian president’s policy
is not simply that he sees strategic value in relations
with Iran, but that he apparently sees diplomatic or
political value in snubbing Washington on this issue.
President Lula has rebutted U.S. criticisms of Iran’s
nuclear programs and post-election repression, and in
March 2010, he denounced American efforts to impose
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UN sanctions on Tehran on the eve of a visit by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.116 The nuclear agreement brokered by Brazil and Turkey in May 2010 was
widely seen as an effort to frustrate U.S. efforts to rally
international support for harsher sanctions against
Iran, leading to further expressions of concern from
American officials.
These points of discord indicate the essential dilemma of U.S.-Brazilian ties—the fact that shared interests do not necessarily lead to cooperative or harmonious relations. For all the commonalities that bind
Brasilia and Washington, the simple fact of growing
Brazilian power, combined with the moderately revisionist grand strategy that President Lula has pursued,
inevitably foster elements in which the two countries’
aims grate against one another. This does not mean
that Brazil and the United States are headed for military conflict, which is almost unthinkable, or even
outright diplomatic hostility. Yet it could eventually
create a situation in which the United States sees Brazil more as a competitor than as a partner, while Brazil
fears that the United States is trying to stunt its natural
geopolitical growth. Such a development is less likely
as long as President Chávez’s activities remind U.S.
and Brazilian policymakers of how much they have
in common, but should this variable be removed from
the equation, a downward turn in the relationship
would not be particularly improbable.
The drawbacks of such a scenario—for the United
States and Brazil alike—are not difficult to imagine.
Brazilian diplomats will find it extremely difficult to
accomplish their major diplomatic goals—a more favorable world trade system, for instance, or Security
Council reform—without the cooperation or at least
the acquiescence of the United States. Similarly, if
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Washington sees Brazil as a rival, it could very well
respond by lending additional support to Chile, Peru,
Colombia, or other countries that remain aloof from
President Lula’s bid for regional hegemony. For the
United States, on the other hand, a productive relationship with Brazil will be central to ensuring a
smooth passage from unipolarity to multipolarity and
maintaining a balance of power that favors democratic norms and institutions. Within the Western Hemisphere, a strained relationship with a rising Brazil
could badly complicate U.S.-Latin American affairs
and could eventually raise the specter of a geopolitical
challenge in Washington’s backyard. Beyond all this,
the prospects for progress on a range of multilateral
issues—from WTO talks to negotiations on climate
change—hinge in substantial measure on productive
dealings between the United States and Brazil. Over
the next several decades, managing this relationship
will therefore be a key diplomatic challenge for officials in both countries.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES
What does the foregoing analysis mean for the
officials charged with crafting Brazilian strategy after President Lula, and for the U.S. diplomats with
whom they will interact? Four general propositions
seem most relevant. First, the trajectory of Brazil’s
ascent and the effectiveness of its grand strategy will
depend on domestic policy as much as foreign policy.
Over the past 25 years, and especially over the past
15, Brazil has made significant progress in strengthening the domestic foundations of national power by
restoring macroeconomic stability, reducing poverty,
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establishing a vibrant democracy, and grappling seriously with pervasive social problems. Indeed, it is this
progress that has given the country the confidence to
act so boldly in world affairs and provided President
Lula with the credibility he enjoys in global forums.
Yet this domestic consolidation is still lacking in many
ways, and there are a variety of outstanding economic, political, and social issues that could delay or even
potentially derail Brazil’s rise.
Managing this danger will require sustained, creative engagement on several fronts: economic policies that remove obstacles to investment and permit
higher levels of growth; social policies that improve
the quality of primary and secondary education and
provide greater access to essential services; holistic
anti-crime measures that reduce citizen insecurity; infrastructure projects that facilitate commerce; and political reforms that mitigate corruption and encourage
greater government responsiveness on the aforementioned issues. There already exist several promising
initiatives designed to address certain of these issues:
an Accelerated Growth Program that reduces tax and
bureaucratic burdens for qualifying businesses, “participatory budgets” that reduce opportunities for corruption in local service provision, community policing
strategies that mimic counterinsurgency in focusing
on cultivating and protecting the population.117 Yet
each of the internal questions listed above constitutes
an immense policy challenge, and it is possible that
meeting some of these challenges may require making
trade-offs with respect to others. Wrestling with these
issues will certainly be a long-term process, one that
requires innovation and experimentation as well as
an ability to resist the allure of measures that may be
politically expedient but will exacerbate the structural
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problems the country still faces. Whether the political
class rises to the occasion in dealing with these issues
will go far in determining the range of possibilities
open to Brazilian diplomats during the next decade
and beyond.
Second, future governments will need to resolve
the contradiction between Brazil’s grand aims for regional leadership and its relative stinginess in promoting this project. As long as South American countries
believe that Brazil is working to further its own hegemonic ambitions rather than the common good, they
are unlikely to provide Brasilia with the diplomatic
support or broadened regional power base it desires.
Brazilian domestic opinion has generally been hostile to increasing aid or the sharing of power with the
neighbors. At some point, however, policymakers and
opinion-shaping elites will have to come to grips with
the fact that a less parsimonious policy will be crucial
to improving Brazil’s image and dealing effectively
with competing regional leadership claims. Initiatives
like the decision to allow $21 million worth of Bolivian
goods to enter the Brazilian market tariff-free in 2009
represent useful gestures, but going forward, more
substantive steps will be required.118
Perhaps the best arena for these measures would
be Mercosul, which is both the core of the consensual
hegemony project and the forum in which regional
power asymmetries are most pronounced. In concept,
FOCEM is designed to pay for infrastructure projects
that will facilitate trade and increase the export competitiveness of its members; what is needed is for Brazil (and, to some extent, Argentina) to increase these
convergence payments and focus them more, if not
entirely, on the poorest members of the group—particularly Paraguay.119 Brazil should also dedicate itself
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to strengthening Mercosul’s governing organs, not
simply by vesting greater powers in the parliament,
but also by developing an effective supranational judicial institution from which the less powerful members can seek recourse in the inevitable event of intrabloc disputes. In the short term, taking these steps
will mean surrendering some of Brazil’s sovereignty
and national advantage. Over the long term, these
measures will be essential to easing tensions within
the group and building an attractive model of regional
integration under Brazilian leadership.
Working toward this outcome will require a greater
resource commitment, which leads to a third imperative of Brazilian strategy—the need for more systematic
resource production and prioritization. As mentioned
above, Brazil needs to mobilize more resources—both
political and economic—to address its deep-seated
internal problems. Additionally, although President
Lula’s frenzied diplomacy has served its purpose of
broadening Brazil’s geopolitical horizons and providing a measure of strategic flexibility, this scattershot
approach to international diplomacy also runs the
risk of dissipating Brazil’s limited economic and diplomatic resources. This problem is especially pressing
given the need for more intensive engagement within
Mercosul, the limitations of global partnerships like
the BRIC forum, and the fact that some of President
Lula’s diplomatic initiatives—his dealings with Iran,
for instance—may ultimately bring more blowback
than benefit.
This does not mean that President Lula’s successors should abandon forums like BRIC and IBSA
rather than seeking to improve them, or that it should
focus exclusively on cultivating a strong regional following. Doing so would simply squander the strate-
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gic flexibility that these leaders will inherit. It means,
rather, that President Lula’s successors should subject
his myriad diplomatic projects to harsh scrutiny, so as
to identify those that are most promising and essential.
This could entail deemphasizing the bid to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council, which will only
become feasible once Brazil gains greater acceptance
as a regional leader, and may in any case be stymied
by Russian or Chinese opposition. It could also entail de-prioritizing one tenuous multilateral partnership—BRIC, for instance—so that Brazilian diplomats
can devote greater energy to making IBSA a more cohesive group. Regardless of the precise formula, what
is essential is that President Lula’s successors choose
carefully among the range of Brazil’s diplomatic options so as to avoid the dispersion of resources that
will eventually result from his all-encompassing approach to foreign policy.
Fourth, both U.S. and Brazilian officials need to
develop coherent approaches to manage bilateral tensions and preserve a constructive partnership. In part,
this goal can be achieved by identifying and focusing the bilateral relationship on areas where the two
countries have convergent interests. The biofuels deal
signed in 2007 exemplifies this ethos; it furthers both
countries’ objective of reducing Latin American energy insecurity and thereby limiting President Chávez’s
regional influence. A civil nuclear energy agreement
modeled on the U.S.-India accord could be similarly
profitable, as could an expansion of security and military ties.120 For all the recent emphasis on constructing
a “defense shield” against U.S. meddling, Brazilian security officials recognize the importance of joint projects to secure chaotic regions like the Tri-Border Area
between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, and there
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is still considerable interest in military exchanges and
exercises as well as reviving a training relationship
that has eroded badly since the 1970s. (Indeed, what
was widely ignored amid the diplomatic squall over
the reactivation of the 4th Fleet was that this measure
will give the United States a better ability to interact
with the Brazilian Navy on issues ranging from training and joint maneuvers to patrolling the South Atlantic.121) Pursuing these and other such initiatives can
broaden the range of measures on which the United
States and Brazil collaborate, thereby encouraging a
more cooperative bilateral norm.
In the same spirit, it would behoove Washington
and Brasilia to exploit issues of asymmetrical interest; in other words, issues on which a concession
costs one power relatively little but benefits the other
a great deal. Two of these issues are particularly salient: ethanol and Iran. Maintaining the 54-cent per
gallon ethanol tariff does the United States little good
economically (this tariff survives solely for domestic
political reasons), and abolishing or even lowering it
would provide a significant economic and diplomatic
boon for Brazil. Similarly, for Brazil to distance itself
somewhat from President Ahmadinejad would entail
only a minimal economic or diplomatic hardship (it
might actually be beneficial for Brazilian diplomacy),
and it would go far in convincing U.S. officials that
Brasilia aspires to be a responsible stakeholder rather
than a disruptive presence. Diplomatic give-and-take
is necessarily a part of any relationship between major countries; focusing on these asymmetrical issues
makes giving somewhat less painful.
Finally, while dialogue is not an end in itself, it
would be useful to strengthen mechanisms for policy
discussion and high-level bilateral communication.
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Poor communication was a factor in at least two recent bilateral disputes, those involving the Colombian
bases deal in 2009 and the flap over the U.S. 4th Fleet
a year earlier. Additionally, there is a broad range of
issues that will require increased high-level consultation in coming years: climate change, trade disputes,
the requirements of maintaining stability in Latin
America, the changing global strategic panorama,
and others. In 1976, Henry Kissinger and his Brazilian
counterparts signed an agreement establishing just
such a forum. The agreement lapsed amid the deterioration of U.S.-Brazilian relations under former President Jimmy Carter, but the current juncture offers a
promising opportunity to revive the idea.122 Doing so
will not prevent the frictions that are bound to occur
between the United States and a rising Brazil, but in
conjunction with the other steps outlined here, it may
help mitigate these conflicts and maintain a productive climate in the relationship.
CONCLUSION
Grand strategy is the relation of means to ends,
the process by which nations harness and allocate resources in the service of their international objectives.
Over the past 8 years, President Lula’s grand strategy
has exploited Brazil’s moral credibility, diplomatic capabilities, and growing economic power to raise his
country’s profile and diversify its strategic portfolio.
Yet, as President Lula’s presidency comes to a close,
there is still much to be done to make Brazil’s foreign
policy equal to its lofty aspirations. Brazil must find
the resources and political will to make its regional
leadership bid more credible; it must become more
discerning in its global partnerships and initiatives; it

60

must work toward a sustainable modus vivendi with
the United States; and, above all, it must marshal the
resources, creativity, and commitment to attack tenacious internal problems.
These are the tasks that fall to President Lula’s
successors. Brazil is undoubtedly going to play a significant part in world politics over the next century;
how significant—and how constructive—will hinge
on how these policymakers address the key dilemmas
of Brazilian grand strategy.
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